When censorship meets mass surveillance

Censorship is nothing unique to old fashioned dictatorships. There are lots of things that you are not allowed to say in todays western democracies.

In many countries you are not allowed to deny certain historic events and certain war crimes in public. Some countries have laws against blasphemy. In some you can not make statements that may be perceived as supportive for certain ideologies or militant organisations. In a few countries you may not be overly positive about homosexuality in public. In others you may not be offensive on HBTQ matters. And most countries have laws against hate speech — that are especially troublesome, as they give certain groups and individuals special rights.

Until recently, the red line was drawn where you made a public speech, published a newspaper article or distributed a leaflet or a poster. But today it has become more complicated.

Should a tweet be considered a public statement? A Facebook post? An Instagram picture? An e-mail on a mailing list? A G+ post to your personal circle of friends?

To complicate things further, the Internet knows no boarders. What is legally published in one country can be read — and illegal — in another.

With mass surveillance you must assume that the government is picking up on everything you do on your computer, smartphone or tablet. If the government wants to know what you are up to, it will know. This might lead to operations like in France recently, where the authorities have been trawling social media for people who might have defended terrorism in one way or another.

There are even cases in Britain where personal SMS/text messages have  been enough for the police to knock on the door, asking people what they are up to.

Censorship and mass surveillance is a particularly bad combination. It will create a mental Panopticon.

/ HAX

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Hot air from Washington on encryption (and a rather chaotic summit on extremism)

US president Barack Obama has been expected to present his policy on encryption for some time now. And, finally, he did. Kind of. Or not.

Ars Technica reports…

“I think the only concern is… our law enforcement is expected to stop every plot. Every attack. Any bomb on a plane. The first time that attack takes place, where it turns out we had a lead and couldn’t follow up on it, the public’s going to demand answers. This is a public conversation that we should be having,” Obama said in a Friday interview with Re/Code. “I lean probably further in the direction of strong encryption than some do inside law enforcement. But I am sympathetic to law enforcement, because I know the kind of pressure they’re under to keep us safe. And it’s not as black and white as it’s sometimes portrayed. Now, in fairness, I think those in favor of air tight encryption also want to be protected from terrorists.”

See the interview at Re/Code here. »

Another presidential quote…

“One of the interesting things about being in this job, is that it does give you a bird’s-eye view. You are smack dab in the middle of these tensions that exist. But, there are times where folks who see this through a civil liberties or privacy lens reject that there’s any tradeoffs involved. And, in fact, there are. And you’ve got to own the fact that it may be that we want to value privacy and civil liberties far more than we do the safety issues. But we can’t pretend that there are no tradeoffs whatsoever.”

The man is clearly stalling.

So what about the international security summit in Washington this week? Well, it seems to have changed in nature towards something more of a high level conference on extremism — to smooth over the fact that President Obama didn’t go to Paris after the terroris attacks. The BBC reports…

Still the planning seems a bit chaotic. Invitations to the summit went out to foreign embassies on 29 January, a State Department official told me.

At an event at the Atlantic Council in Washington on the following day, European officials said they still weren’t sure which minister would be appropriate to send to Washington.

Even those who are passionate about the goals of the summit – combating violent extremism – wonder about the optics – a term the Washington political class use to describe how an event is perceived.

In the end, it all boiled down to being a back drop for president Obama to deliver yet another very Kum Ba Yah speech.

The trip to Washington did however provide an opportunity for a plethora of meetings between EU and US politicians and security officials. Which is probably where all the interesting stuff went on. The stuff the general public is not supposed to know about — yet.

/ HAX

Links:
The Obama interview at Re/Code »
Ars Technica: Obama hedges position on encryption. It’s good. It’s bad. »
Slate: Tech Whiplash: Obama Endorses, Then Undermines, Encryption »
BBC: Extremism summit: Too little, too late, too chaotic? »
White House: Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism »
Breitbart: Extremists Attending Obama’s ‘Countering Extremism’ Summit »

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Please support EDRi!

During the five years that I worked in the European Parliament – one organisation stood out when it came to protecting our digital rights (on issues like privacy, data protection, mass surveillance, web censorship etc.)

That organisation is EDRi – European Digital Rights.

EDRi is campaigning in a very hands on way, asking the hard questions at public hearings, serving the European Commission and the European Parliament with facts and helping members of parliament to fight and amend bad legislation.

It is essential that EDRi will be able to continue its work. They are often the last defence line when politicians endanger our free and open Internet.

Please follow these links to support EDRi:
Final push for our crowdsourcing campaign »
Support Digital Rights in Europe! »
Donation FAQ »

Tank you. Very Much.

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The EU and a global ban on encryption

Will encryption become illegal? Will governments demand “golden keys” to commonly used encryption? If governments will go after encryption, will they make a difference between encryption used in Internet “base traffic” and encryption used by people to protect their mail and hard drives? What about apps? Nobody seems to know. All we do know is that governments would like to have access to all our communications.

Even if they have tried to keep it under wraps EU member states would like to circumvent encryption. In a leaked dokument from the informal meeting with EU justice and home affairs ministers the other week (PDF), we have it in writing…

“Since the Snowden revelations, internet and telecommunications companies have started to use often de-centralized encryption which increasingly makes lawful interception by the relevant national authorities technically difficult or even impossible. The Commission should be invited to explore rules obliging internet and telecommunications companies operating in the EU to provide under certain conditions as set out in the relevant national laws and in full compliance with fundamental rights access of the relevant national authorities to communications (i.e. share encryption keys). “

So, we pretty much know what the EU stance will be at the Global Security Summit, in the US nest week.

Interestingly, the European Parliament seems to have an opposite position. In its resolution on mass surveillance of March 2014, the Parliament states that…

[The EP] calls on the Commission to […] ensure a high level of security of telecommunication networks and services, including by way of requiring state-of-the-art end-to-end encryption of communications.

[The EP] calls for the EU to take the lead in […] rerouting of Internet traffic or full end-to-end encryption of all Internet traffic so as to avoid the current risks associated with unnecessary routing of traffic through the territory of countries that do not meet basic standards on fundamental rights, data protection and privacy.

[The EP] calls for the promotion of … encrypting communication in general, including email and SMS communication.

Apparently the European Parliament takes a very different stand, compared to EU member states.

And the Council of Europe (a parlament-like assembly with representatives from most European countries, including non-EU states) makes its position clear in a report…

“The assembly is deeply worried about threats to internet security by the practice of certain intelligence agencies […] of seeking out systematically, using and even creating “back doors” […] which could easily be exploited also by terrorists and cyber-terrorists or other criminals. […] The creation of “back doors” or any other techniques to weaken or circumvent security measures or exploit their existing weaknesses should be strictly prohibited.”

Again, this is a clear standpoint, the very opposite to that of EU member states.

To continue, we have a study from the European Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment unit stating…

“The only way for citizens to counteract surveillance and prevent breach of privacy consists in guaranteeing uncorrupted end-to-end encryption of content and transport channel in all their communications.”

“The EU should invest in resilient open source implementations of different encryption specifications that can be verified and validated for correctness … providing users with unbreakable cryptographic protection. … The EU should invest in making users aware […] how [they] can reduce their digital footprint by following behavioural rules and applying encryption and anonymising principles.”

To put it simply: EU member states would love to have a ban on encryption or a “golden key”. Other relevant European institutions take an opposite standpoint — valuing and defending encryption.

But it will be the EU member states (and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) who are present at the Global Security Summit in Washington the coming week. And they will try to make their position global policy.

There is a way to get an encryption ban / golden key out of the summits agenda. That is to make this a public issue, to get the media involved and for people to speak out against this madness.

What we do right now will define our future.

/ HAX

Links:
• Not this again! Europe mustn’t backtrack on its support of encryption and rejection of surveillance »
• Next Week, World Leaders Will Meet to Talk About How Much They Hate Encryption »
• Council of the European Union (EU member states) PDF »
• Council of Europe (PDF) »
• UK Surveillance Consultation Suggests It Is End-Point Security, Not Encryption, That Cameron Wants To Subvert »
• In two weeks time, world leaders may decide to undermine encryption »

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Big Brotherism at the EU summit this week

Thursday and Friday EU leaders will get together for yet another summit. There are burning issues such as Ukraine and Greece on the agenda — but also a couple of surveillance topics to watch closely.

One is EU PNR – a register on our intra-EU air travel. The idea is to collect various data about us and our travel habits, to be saved for five years.

The European Parliament has tried to block EU PNR, as it does not meet its standards when it comes to privacy and data protection. Just a few days ago the majority position was that you should not retain personal data about all air passengers in the EU — only when it comes to “a smaller target list of suspects”.

But in Strasbourg today, the Parliament adopted an notably vague resolution. From the press release

MEPs pledge to work “towards the finalisation of an EU PNR directive by the end of the year” and encourage member states to make progress on the Data Protection Package, so that negotiations on both proposals can take place in parallel. They aim to ensure that data collection and sharing is based on a coherent data protection framework offering legally-binding personal data protection standards across the EU.

This can — or should — be read as a signal to the summit to go ahead with EU PNR. The Parliaments has just indicated that it will co-operate. This is just the kind of resolution normally adopted when EU member states applies arm twisting to the peoples elected representatives. Now, the Parliament has committed to deliver this year.

Then we have the matter of encryption. Still there is nothing from the US administration — expected to put forward its new policy on encryption any day now. But in the UK we have demands from Prime Minister Cameron, that national security agencies must be able to access all of citizens telecommunications.

This surely must be on the EU summit agenda this week. The risk, however, is if topics like Ukraine and Greece drags out — EU leaders will just rubber stamp all other prepared dossiers, like this one.

If there will be a move to sidestep encryption (and everything points in that direction) next Thursdays Global Security Summit in the US will be the time and the place. But first, EU leaders ought to coordinate.

The third point on my watch list is the role of Internet service providers and social platforms. It has been very quiet since the informal meeting with EU justice and interior ministers in Riga a week and a half ago. There it was decided to deepen cooperation with the Internet industry “and to strengthen the commitment of social media platforms in order to reduce illegal content online”.

Will this be taken to the next level by EU leaders this week? Or is regulation already being prepared in the opaque European Commission administration?

Eyes and ears, please. The EU summit kicks off tomorrow.

/ HAX

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The real impact of surveillance

Job-seekers under surveillance can lose income needed to survive if their online activity fails to match up to job search demands. People interested in campaigning hestiate over getting involved with movements for social justice when the police count activism as akin to domestic terrorism.

It’s clear that surveillance affects a broad group of people, with real painful consequences for their lives. We’ve seen journalists being monitored, lawyers having their client confidentiality broken, victims of police misconduct being spied on and environmental campaigns infiltrated. These people are not criminals, and yet when we have a system of mass surveillance, they become targets for increasingly intrusive powers.

We also know that state surveillance stigmatises certain groups of the population, it targets communities and networks. Innocent people who share similarities with suspects, (similar Skype chat user names, nearby places of worship, physical location) fall under intense scrutiny, like having their private web cam chats examined. Mass surveillance disproportionally affects marginalized groups and fosters mistrust.

Read more at Open Rights Group: The real impact of surveillance »

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European Parliament still standing up to PNR

Thursday and Friday this week there will be another EU summit, where national leaders will adress security issues. A European Passenger Name Registration (PNR) system will to be among the top subjects on the agenda — as this also is to be a priority topic at the Global Security Summit in the US next week.

But the European Parliament will not back down. The majority position seems to be that you should not retain personal data about all air passengers in the EU — only when it comes to “a smaller target list of suspects”.

Liberal MEP Sophie in’t Veld declares that “fundamental issues of trust surrounding data sharing needed to be addressed before provisions for collecting data are centralised”.

Read more: Parliament resists pressure on passenger data ahead of EU summit »

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In two weeks time, world leaders may decide to undermine encryption

There are telltale signs that the US administration will move against encryption. The latest comes from Bob Litt, the General Counsel for the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

In a speech this week he echoed the demand that government should be allowed access to all our information. Among other things, he touched on the idea of a magical golden key.

I’m not a cryptographer, but I am an optimist: I believe that if our businesses and academics put their mind to it, they will find a solution that does not compromise the integrity of encryption technology but that enables both encryption to protect privacy and decryption under lawful authority to protect national security.

Even if this is not a ban on encryption, it is very serious. Mike Masnick at  Techdirt explains…

I’m not sure how many times in how many different ways this needs to be explained, but what they’re asking for is a fantasy. You cannot put a backdoor in encryption and create a magic rule that says “only the government can use this in lawful situations.” That’s just not how it works. At all. The very idea of decryption by a third party “compromises the integrity of the encryption technology,” almost by definition.

But I’m not sure this will be considered as a valid argument by our ignorant politicians.

It would make little sense for the US to go for a “magical golden key” on its own. Likely other members of the NSA Five Eyes group (UK, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland) will do the same.

And the EU? Europe normally follows the US in these matters. There will be an Global Security Summit in Washington later this month. And there are reasons to believe that also politicians in most EU member states would like to give their authorities the ability to circumvent encryption.

As EU member state ministers for justice and home affairs made their last meeting (in Riga) an informal one, this topic might very well have been up for discussion. (But the public is not allowed to know exactly what went on.) This is exactly what you might expect — and exactly the kind of thing the Council would keep under wraps, to avoid debate and protests until it’s too late. And the timing is just right.

The way the world is right now (Ukraine, IS and potential monetary crises) it should be no problem for world leaders to package the whole thing as “emergency legislation”.

The European Parliament will object, no doubt. But it will be sidestepped. All EU member states have to do is to agree to make this national legislation in all (or most) member states.

As a matter of fact, the EU has no formal competence when it comes to national security matters. So it will have to be a multilateral arrangement.

All the European Parliament can do is to try to protect human and civil rights in a wider sense. But that will probably not go beyond a sharply formulated resolution.

The matter can be sent to the European Court of Justice (for breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) or the European Court of Human Rights (upholding the European Convention on Human Rights). But in both cases a court process may drag out for years.

In this matter, politicians can do almost as they want. And they will not fail to make use of current world events as an excuse. (Never waste a good crisis.) The only thing that might stop them is general outcry — on a massive scale.

Soon we will know. All eyes on the Global Security Summit in the US on February 18.

/ HAX

Techdirt: Intelligence Community’s Top Lawyer Endorses Desire For Unicorns, Leprechauns & Golden Keys That Don’t Undermine Encryption »

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