Archive | War on Terror

EU:s ambiguous directive on combating terrorism

This week the Human Rights Committee (LIBE) in the European Parliament will finalize the formalities on the new EU directive on combating terrorism. There is little room for changes, as there has been closed door negotiations (trialogue) on the content between the Parliament, the Council (member states) and the Commission. From LIBE the directive will go to the vote in the December Parliamentary plenary session in Strasbourg.

This directive is an odd document as national security is not formally an EU competence. Newer the less, it has been rushed trough the system and is now close to becoming EU law.

The document can be seen as a response to the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks. It is surely the result of pressure on EU member states interior ministers to be seen to do… something.

The directive is notably vague. Maybe even suspiciously vague.

Among the listed purposes for illegal terrorist actions, we can read the following »seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation«. And on form»given their nature or context«.

This is vague. And it sounds dangerously close to… suppressing opposition or perfectly legitimate disruptive political activism. Would this label e.g. a tax revolt terrorism?

Threats to »information systems« resulting in »major economic loss« are also mentioned. Exactly where does this place some forms of hacking or maybe a DDoS attack? Will hackers now be deemed to be terrorists?

And exactly what does the following suggest? »Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (h) of Article 3(2), where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.«

The wording »whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences« is just confusing.

»For an offence referred to in Article 4 and Title III to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed, nor shall it be necessary to establish a link to a specific terrorist offence or, insofar as the offences in Articles 9 to 11 are concerned, to specific offences related to terrorist activities.«

Isn’t that a bit ambiguous?

So it continues. And I’m not the only one being suspicious…

Amnesty International, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), European Digital Rights (EDRi), the Fundamental Rights European Experts (FREE) Group, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Open Society Foundations (OSF) are warning that the overly broad language of the new EU Directive on Combating Terrorism could lead to criminalising public protests and other peaceful acts, to the suppression of the exercise of freedom of expression protected under international law, including expression of dissenting political views and to other unjustified limitations on human rights. The Directive’s punitive measures also pose the risk of being disproportionately applied and implemented in a manner that discriminates against specific ethnic and religious communities.

It seems that the purpose of this directive is to expand the scope of the anti-terror legislation to cover as much as possible. The risk is that it will go too far – labeling opposition, activism, hacking, and some other political activities as terrorism. Especially as it is up to the member states to implement this directive. There are plenty of politicians in Europe just looking for an excuse to silence uncomfortable voices and disruptive political movements.

/ HAX

LIBE meeting documents »

EDRi: European Union Directive on counterterrorism is seriously flawed »

0

“EU Directive on counterterrorism is seriously flawed”

A terrorism Directive put together without a proper consultation, without any impact assessment and without meaningful public debate creates the worst possible outcome

…said Joe McNamee, Executive Director of European Digital Rights.

It is too unclear to be implemented in a harmonised way across the EU, too shrouded in secrecy to have public legitimacy and too open to interpretation to prevent wilful abuse by governments seeking to exploit its weaknesses.

EDRi: European Union Directive on counterterrorism is seriously flawed »

Terrorism Directive: Document pool »

0

A free and open Internet is crucial for a free and open society

We live in interesting times.

There is Big Brotherism, censorship of social media, information warfare, the war on terror, the war on drugs and politicians curtailing our civil liberties one small piece at a time. Soon we might have an entirely erratic president in the White House (who e.g. has threatened to close down the Internet) in control of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In Russia, it’s all war rhetoric these days. In Turkey, the failed coup d’état has lead to an even more totalitarian political climate. Nationalism, protectionism, xenophobia and authoritarianism seems to be in demand. Corporatism has a firm grip over western politics, and the democratic deficit is growing. Things are shifting.

It is easy to be pessimistic and wise to be cautious.

My hope is with free flows of information. Not top down, but between people.

Information is power. An integrated network of citizens on the Internet limits the possibility for those in power to get away with bullshit. So, politicians hate it. (And they often gang up with other enemies of free information – e.g. the law- and intelligence community, the copyright industry and practically everybody who will never miss an opportunity to throw a moralistic, self-righteous fit.)

On the Internet – people can scrutinize the power elite. Citizen journalists and activists have platforms to publish significant and delicate information – that the ruling political class would prefer to keep away from the public eye. Knowledge, facts, and information are searchable at our fingertips. Lies can quickly be exposed. Authority can be questioned in a meaningful way. Spontaneous networking knows no borders and can give people a chance to look into, understand and change politics.

A free flow of information promotes cooperation. Often in new and unexpected ways. People in different places and countries will work together, spontaneously. The academic world will blossom. Relationships will develop. Good things will happen. Progress will occur. And people will never go to war against each other again. Stability, prosperity, and liberty will be the preferred position.

That is why a free and open Internet is important.

/ HAX

0

Meanwhile, in France…

“The State of Emergency in France has been extended until January. In reaction to violence shaking the country and with the presidential election of 2017 only a few months away, political leaders are indulging an ignominious orgy of security-driven policy. Not satisfied with merely prolonging the state of emergency, lawmakers have also amended the 2015 Intelligence Act passed last year to legalize domestic mass surveillance.”

La Quadrature du Net » French State of Emergency: Overbidding Mass Surveillance »

0

Fighting the roots of terrorism

“Dropping bombs on oil refineries or conducting unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against jihadist leaders is easy. By contrast, building strong institutions that can resist corruption and govern fairly and justly is far more difficult. The very failure to build such institutions has given rise to resurgent jihadism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Mali.

For citizens of corrupt, repressive or even kleptocratic states, jihadism’s utopian message resonates far more loudly — just as Marxism’s did. It is no coincidence that despite their best efforts, the KGB and its affiliated intelligence services found little success in fomenting insurgencies in parts of the West with good, honest governance. The seeds that the communists planted never grew and flourished as they did in places where inept or repressive regimes held power.”

Link: What The Cold War Can Learn Us About Jihadism »

0

Cyber war capabilities and mass surveillance

We definitely need cyber defence capabilities. Foreign powers, terrorists, and criminal networks have the capability to harm key functions in our societies.

We also need capacity for offensive cyber operations. No doubt, this will be a part of tomorrow’s conflicts and there is an ongoing cyber war arms race. Several western countries affiliated with NSA is adapting to this. (E.g. Sweden has recently made changes to legalise offensive operations, that according to the Snowden documents are already in place.)

First of all, the threshold for cyber attacks is lower than for conventional military conflicts. At the same time, most countries have made it clear that they will consider cyber attacks as an actual act of war. So there are reasons to tread carefully.

This is a grey area. It is difficult to be sure if a cyber attack originates from another nation or a criminal or terrorist organisation. In the same way, it is difficult to know who you engage in defensive or offensive cyber operations. Things might easily escalate.

Second, there is no clear line separating conventional mass surveillance and cyber warfare. One can easily spill over into the other. The lines are muddled. The rule of law can easily be circumvented by labelling surveillance that would be illegal in “civil” law enforcement as secret “military” operations.

Third, cyber warfare capabilities are frequently outsourced to private contractors. This will make it even harder to uphold democratic oversight and accountability.

I would argue that one major problem with cyber warfare capabilities is that they might be used to conceal domestic intelligence operations outside the realm of the law.

This calls for vigilance.

/ HAX

Statewatch » Council documents: responses to offensive cyber operations; “cyber capacity building” in non-EU countries; implementation report on Cyber Defence Policy Framework »

0