Turning friends into threats

Some weeks ago there was some attention and upset reactions about the Chinese concept of “Sesame Credits”. It’s all about what you say, read, buy and do on the Internet. Your credit status then might decide if you can get e.g. a bank loan or permission to travel abroad.

Nasty indeed. But what make the whole thing really upsetting is that your credit status also will be affected by what your friends do online. This really is a diabolic tool for “social control”. (Video»)

It is easy to believe that it is only those communists in China and such anti-democratic regimes that could apply a system like this.

But, actually, most western democracies can easily do the same thing with data retention. This is a perfect tool for building sociograms. A sociogram is a map showing who is connected to who when it comes to the internet and telecommunications. How the authorities look at you can be determined by the friends you have (and by what friends they have).

So, even if you have “nothing to hide” — you still certainly do have something to fear.

And it’s not just about data retention. The same (or even more detailed) information is collected by Facebook and Google. It most certinly can be obtained by the authorities — and is probably also for sale out there. It would be very strange if various intelligence agencies don’t already have access to this information.

In this way, Big Brotherism is breaking down trust between people in our societies. And that is a very bad thing.

/ HAX

Citizens or serfs?

One way of looking at society is that it consists of free individuals – citizens – joined in a community. And in a democracy, the people elect a group of peers to manage a limited amount of things that are better handled together. But people are, in general, responsible for their own lives. This is a firm and sound bottom to top approach.

Then we have the opposite, the top to bottom point of view. Here politicians and bureaucrats are the nuclei of society. It is what they want that is important and they claim to have some sort of right to decide over other people. This ruling class can enforce its will with the help of its armed wing, the police. In this society, the people is totally subordinate to the state and its needs (and whims). This type of society is predisposed for central planning and control. And it is less resilient, as it will have many potential single points of failure.

Today’s modern western societies mainly fall into the latter category. We, the people are not free citizens — but serfs.

The concept of mass surveillance makes perfect “sense” from this perspective. You will have to control the people, supervising that it is doing what it has been told to do. And those in power often find it useful if the people fear the state, at least to some degree.

Meanwhile, governments are becoming less transparent. Ever more deals are struck behind closed doors. Democracy has become an empty excuse for rubber-stamping laws and rules that mainly benefit the system, those in power and their special interest friends.

Recently, the US took the top bottom approach to new extremes. The tax authorities, the IRS, now has the power to revoke people’s passports. If you owe taxes to the government, you can be prevented from leaving the country. What is this, if not serfdom?

The question is what to do about this development towards an ever more totalitarian society. Why are there no steadfast and reliable political forces trying to lead society right again? (Yes, I know. Libertarian political leadership is in so many ways a contradiction in terms. But what is the alternative?)

/ HAX

The normalisation of mass surveillance

Once upon a time, there were rumors about a global surveillance network — Echelon. When the European Parliament decided to look into the matter, it turned out it did indeed exist. For years to follow there were rumors about US intelligence organisation NSA and its new capabilities to “collect it all”. And a few years ago, the Snowden documents exposed exactly that.

Then followed a state of resignation.

In 2013/14, it was brought to light that the NSA might have compromised the international clearing system for bank transfers, European run SWIFT. It’s a bit odd, as the US can have as much information about European bank transfers as they want, in accordance with the EU-US TFTP agreement. Newer the less, there were strong indications of something going on. This time the European police agency, Europol, didn’t even bother to look into the matter. In a European Parliament hearing Europol director Bob Wainwright explicitly said so. (The hearing is quite surreal. It’s all on video here. »)

In Germany, politicians softened their tone against the US/NSA when threatened with limited access to US intelligence. It also turned out that under the level of political polemic, the BND had been working very closely with the NSA all the time. And in Sweden, according to the Snowden files, SIGINT organisation FRA has access to NSA superdatabase XKeyscore. Swedish politicians (including the Greens, who are now in government) will not even comment on the legality of this.

The European Court of Justice has invalidated the EU data retention directive, finding it in breach of fundamental human rights. Never the less most EU member states are upholding (and in some cases implementing) data retention, leading national constitutional courts to object. But data retention fits well with US surveillance systems, so it seems to be less important if it is legal or not.

I could go on, but I better get to my point.

Politicians and intelligence bureaucrats are sending some pretty clear signals these days. They do not care about what is legal or not legal. They do not care if being exposed. They do not even comment on issues that ought to be fundamental in a democracy. The message is: This is the way it is. Live with it.

If there was ever need for a broad political movement against mass surveillance, it is now.

/ HAX

EU to coordinate member state intelligence?

(EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) De Kerchove, who stressed in front of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) earlier this year to “never let a serious crisis go to waste”, now told the European Observer that “[y]ou don’t want people to know (…) that you have Big Brother interception by satellite or that you have people infiltrating computers”.

EDRi: EU encourages cooperation between intelligence agencies »

Crypto wars, the simple truth

“To put it bluntly: the call to provide law enforcement (or, anyone) exceptional access to communications and content poses a grave threat to the future of the Internet. It is simply not possible to give the good guys the access they want without letting the bad guys in. There’s nothing new or novel in this statement. Experts have been saying the same thing for 20 years. While the message is old, with the integration of Internet technologies into nearly all aspects of life, the stakes are higher than they’ve ever been.”

Meredith Whittaker and Ben Laurie: Wanting It Bad Enough Won’t Make It Work: Why Adding Backdoors and Weakening Encryption Threatens the Internet »

The real danger with state spy trojans

A state trojan is when a government authority places a secret, hidden spy program on your computer, smartphone, tablet or server. It can be used to monitor everything you do. No matter if you use encryption or safe messaging apps. What you see, the police and intelligence authorities will see. Every keystroke can be tracked, often in real time. All your files can be accessed. All your communications can be scrutinized.

And, in the words of the founder of state intelligence, Cardinal Richelieu… “If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him.”

Many countries are already using state spy trojans for surveillance. And others are to follow suit. At the moment countries like Spain and Sweden are trying to rush legislation trough.

State trojans are usually not used for mass surveillance. (But they can be.) At least not in most countries — where some sort or court order or other judicial process under the rule of law will apply before the trojan is being launched. So, the main problem in most cases is not about people’s right to privacy in general. This is targeted surveillance. But of course, it can be misused and/or used too generously.

The real problem is that state (and other) spy trojans will make our computers and entire IT systems vulnerable. In turn, this can be used by criminals, by foreign governments and by others interested in you, your communications and your data.

And what will happen when governments are using the same sort of tools as criminals? In the words of Amelia Andersdotter and Christer Spörndly… “The logical, and very disturbing, consequence is that there will be no incitement to identify and stop security vulnerabilities.” There are no security glitches only accessible for the government. If you leave a door open, it is open for everyone.

And to build these spy trojans, governments will have to use some sort of known security vulnerabilities. Or even worse, they might buy spyware from external developers — who also have other customers…

State spy trojans are a nightmare. They will make us all less safe.

/ HAX